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I
n financial crises of the recent past, investors often withdrew from 
securities markets and placed their funds into safer assets, such as 
U.S. Treasuries and bank deposits. During such episodes, a wide 
range of businesses shut out of securities markets sought to fund their 
operations by drawing down credit lines established with banks during 
normal times. Awash with funds from depositors seeking a safe haven, 
banks had no difficulty meeting these increased credit demands. Thus, 
banks helped avoid financial disruptions and business liquidations that 
would have occurred in the absence of a liquidity backstop.   
In 2007-09, however, banks were at the center of the financial cri-
sis. While significant risks were present in some other financial institu-
tions, this crisis was special in that commercial banks were much more 
exposed to losses than in recent past crises. This key feature of the crisis 
casts doubt on the notion that banks are a natural source of liquidity 
during financial crises. Were bank deposits still viewed as a safe haven, 
and if not, how compromised was their ability to meet the demand 
for liquidity? This article examines how commercial bank deposits and 
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lending evolved during the recent crisis compared with past episodes of 
financial stress. 
The article concludes that the bank-centered nature of the crisis 
made it harder than in the past for banks to attract deposits and provide 
liquidity to borrowers shut out of securities markets. The first section 
of the article explores the main similarity and the key difference of 
the 2007-09 financial crisis with previous financial market disruptions. 
The second section reviews the theory that banks can provide liquidity 
when financial markets and other financial institutions cannot—and 
why the theory might break down in a bank-centered crisis. The third 
section presents new evidence, both from aggregate and individual 
bank data, that funds did not flow into bank deposits as robustly as in 
past times of stress and bank lending did not increase as much. To de-
termine if these differences were due to the bank-centered nature of the 
crisis, the section also investigates whether deposits and loans increased 
less at banks where deposits were more likely to be viewed as unsafe.   
I.  COMPARING THE 2007-09 CRISIS WITH PREVIOUS  
FINANCIAL CRISES
The financial crisis of 2007-09 was similar to previous crises in 
that the need for liquidity by businesses and households was unmet by 
market-based sources of funding. There was also a key difference: The 
banking system was arguably more adversely affected by credit losses 
and uncertainty surrounding these losses than in recent previous crises.     
The similarity of the 2007-09 and past crises
One common feature of past financial crises was a need for liquid-
ity. Businesses, households, and other economic entities needed funds 
to cover day-to-day operations and investments, but found it difficult 
or even impossible to borrow in securities markets. The investors that 
supplied market funds may have suffered a major loss in one market 
or may have changed their beliefs about risks or uncertainty in the 
economy. As a result, these investors shifted funds to low-risk assets, 
such as U.S. Treasury bonds, in what is known as a “flight to safety.” 
Thus, borrowers from a range of sectors became vulnerable to financing 
disruptions at the same time—that is, to a systemic liquidity shortage.       ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  33
In such crises, the demand for liquidity usually came from nonfi-
nancial businesses. Even large, creditworthy corporations found it dif-
ficult to place corporate bonds, raise equity financing, and even borrow 
short-term by selling promissory notes such as commercial paper.1 As it 
got difficult to renew maturing commercial paper, firms relied on bor-
rowing at shorter maturities, such as overnight financing. Even compa-
nies with continued access to the commercial paper market faced rising 
costs of funding.    
One important example of the need for liquidity in past episodes of 
financial stress was the bankruptcy of Penn Central, a railroad compa-
ny. Its bankruptcy in 1970 was the largest up to that time and resulted 
in a flight to safety by investors. As a result, firms from a wide range 
of industries not related to transportation found that they could not 
refinance their commercial paper.
A more recent example was the liquidity squeeze in the fall of 1998, 
following the Russian sovereign debt default (Chart 1). This event led 
to increased volatility in global financial markets that spilled over to the 
United States and led to the failure of the Long Term Capital Manage-
ment (LTCM) hedge fund. As a result, market liquidity—that is, the 
supply of credit from market sources, such as corporate bonds, equity, 
and commercial paper—was disrupted. For example, the difference be-
tween the commercial paper interest rate paid by a typical high-grade 
borrower relative to that paid by the U.S. Treasury on an equal maturity 
of 90 days jumped about 50 basis points, from roughly 0.50 percent at 
the end of August 1998 to over 1 percent by early October. 
Similar episodes followed: the Y2K uncertainty at the end of 1999, 
the bursting of the tech bubble in the spring of 2000, and the terrorist 
attacks on September 11, 2001 (Hakkio and Keeton).2 
A demand for liquidity by businesses was also evident in the fi-
nancial crisis of 2007-09. The commercial paper spread first spiked in 
the middle of August 2007 to over 100 basis points for those borrow-
ers still able to access the commercial paper market (Chart 1). At the 
same time, many companies were shut out of securities markets and 
could not renew debt even at short-term maturities of less than one 
year. Institutional investors, such as money market funds that typically 
buy the commercial paper of a wide range of companies, reduced their 
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about 6 percent from July to August 2007. A second wave of market 
stress took place in September 2008, following the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy and the failures of other financial institutions, as commer-
cial paper spreads shot up above 200 basis points. This time, unsecured 
commercial paper dropped 13 percent from a month earlier. 
In this crisis, the special entities set up to intermediate securities 
created from mostly household debt were also shut out of capital mar-
kets, and they also experienced an increased demand for liquidity. Since 
the 1980s, many consumer loans, such as auto loans, credit card debt, 
and student debt, had been packaged together into asset-backed se-
curities (ABS). These securities helped to diversify the risk of any one 
household falling behind on its loan. Investors, such as mutual funds, 
were willing to hold these securities in their portfolios because they 
did not have to examine information about each household, a costly 
exercise. But such investors generally prefer shorter-term securities than 
mortgage-backed securities and ABS, which typically have maturities of 
five to ten years. This led to the development of the asset-backed com-
mercial paper (ABCP) market. ABCP is short-term commercial paper 
issued by special entities (conduits or structured investment vehicles) 
to fund assets such as ABS. As a result of these developments, house-
holds enjoyed a cheaper cost of funds, and the conduits and structured 
Chart 1
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investment vehicles set up to issue ABCP were able to roll over their 
short-term liabilities backed by asset-backed securities. In July 2007, 
outstanding ABCP equaled $1.2 trillion, accounting for the largest part 
of the commercial paper market.3
As with corporate debt, the supply of funding for securities backed 
by household debt was sensitive to shocks to market liquidity. In the 
crisis of 2007-09, risk assessments first rose on subprime mortgage-
related securities and then increased on other ABS (Chart 2). The re-
sulting systemic freeze in market liquidity also affected ABCP issuers, 
and ABCP issuance came to a halt. As a result, outstanding ABCP fell 
17 percent from July to August 2007. 
The difference between the 2007-09 crisis and past financial crises
While this crisis resembled crises of the recent past in terms of li-
quidity demand, it differed in that its risks were more concentrated in 
the banking system.4 The performance of the commercial banking sys-
tem declined more sharply in this crisis than in past crises. The bank-
ing system’s profitability fell as aggregate return on assets dropped from 
1 percent at an annual rate at the start of 2007 to nearly -1 percent 
by the end of 2008 (Chart 3).5 In contrast, return on assets hovered 
Chart 2
CONSUMER ABS SPREAD 1997−2009
Source: Citicorp for ABS yield via Bloomberg
Federal Reserve H15 release for Treasury 5-year yield

























Percentage Points36  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 3
BANK PROFITABILITY (RETURN ON ASSETS) 1997-2009
Chart 4
1997-2009 BANK EQUITY PERFORMANCE
Source: Reports of Condition and Income
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around 1 percent during the earlier episodes of financial stress, such 
as the LTCM crisis. The market value of bank equity also took a hit,   
edging down sooner and more sharply than the aggregate S&P 500 mar-
ket index (Chart 4). 
Commercial banks were especially affected in this crisis because of 
their exposure to real estate loans and mortgage-related securities, which 
soured as the house price boom came to an end. Many of these securi-ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  37
ties found their way onto banks’ balance sheets, as opposed to being 
sold to institutional investors such as money market funds and pension 
funds. As a result, commercial banks’ holdings of real estate loans and 
mortgage-backed securities accounted for about 40 percent of the total 
amount of such loans and securities outstanding in 2007.6
All banks, not just banks with a concentrated exposure to mort-
gage-related securities, suffered in the crisis due to the panic that de-
veloped from a lack of information and loss of confidence. Uncertainty 
about exposures related to mortgages made it impossible for counter-
parties—even among banks—to gauge the other party’s soundness. As 
a result, the interbank interest spread reached unprecedented levels. 
The financial commercial paper market, a marginal source of funding 
for the banking system, was also severely strained (Chart 1).7 Banks had 
to pledge more collateral for any given amount of borrowing that they 
were able to obtain. The uncertainty and lack of information about 
the quality of banks’ assets caused initial losses on subprime mortgage 
securities to morph into a much wider banking crisis.8   
II.  BANKS AS LIQUIDITY PROVIDERS
In theory, banks are well suited to provide liquidity during typical 
financial crises when financial markets, such as the commercial paper 
market, cannot. Banks are viewed as safe havens because their deposits 
are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the government. Thus, the 
funds that flow into bank deposits during times of market stress are 
available to finance loans to borrowers in need of liquidity. This section 
explains this relationship and why banks may not be as well suited to 
provide liquidity in a bank-centered crisis.9
How banks provide liquidity
 To provide liquidity in a crisis, banks supply credit, especially short-
term credit, to groups shut out of the capital markets. These groups, 
discussed in Section I, include nonfinancial corporations that cannot 
sell commercial paper, households needing to finance consumption, and 
conduits facing little appetite for their asset-backed commercial paper. 
How is it that banks offer liquidity to these borrowers when the 
market is unwilling to do so? To understand how, it is important to 
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times various forms of backup credit lines with commercial banks. In 
this article, the term credit line refers to any commitment (whether ex-
plicit or implicit) offered by a bank to a given borrower on terms often 
negotiated prior to the crisis. Examples of such commitments include 
commercial paper backup lines, consumer home equity lines, overdraft 
protection, asset-backed commercial paper credit enhancements via 
standby letters of credit, and so on. By honoring these credit lines dur-
ing financial crises, banks serve as insurance for borrowers who sud-
denly find themselves liquidity-constrained. These borrowers turn to 
banks for the funds needed to avoid the disruptions and liquidations 
that would occur in the absence of this insurance.    
 The main institutional characteristics of a bank are that it makes 
loans and offers demand deposits. When a borrower accesses a credit 
line, the amount taken down is transferred from the bank’s off-balance- 
sheet to its balance sheet. The bank’s loan portfolio therefore increases, 
all else held constant. Banks typically honor these commitments, even 
when they are not legally obliged to do so. In the past, credit lines were 
extended mainly to businesses or households. More recently, however, 
banks have extended credit lines to the special entities that issue ABCP.10
Why banks have an advantage in providing liquidity
The discussion so far has shown how banks provide liquidity to 
borrowers in need of funds. But why is it that banks are special in this 
sense? That is, why do banks have an advantage in providing these credit 
lines that other financial institutions, such as finance companies, do not? 
Diversification.  One important advantage for banks relates to 
how they resolve the liquidity management problem that arises when 
commitments are converted into funded loans. To provide liquidity on 
demand, a financial institution must hold a liquid asset buffer. These 
assets can take the form of cash or securities like U.S. Treasury bills that 
can be easily transformed into cash without a loss of value. Liquidating 
such assets means that the proceeds can be used to finance the drawn 
credit lines. In theory, any financial institution could hold sufficient 
liquid cushions. But holding a sufficiently ample amount of liquid as-
sets is costly because the return on these assets is low compared with the 
alternative use of these funds. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  39
How do banks avoid holding a large amount of idle low-return 
liquid assets, even though they are the dominant financial institution 
offering credit lines? They combine deposit-taking with loan commit-
ments. A synergy exists between these two activities to the extent that 
both services require banks to hold balances of liquid assets to provide 
liquidity on demand to depositors as well as to credit line borrowers. 
Banks diversify the liquidity demands of their depositors and borrowers 
and, in so doing, economize on this common liquid resource. Diver-
sification is possible as long as depositors and borrowers have liquidity 
demands that are independent in the sense that deposit withdrawals 
are uncorrelated with drawdowns of credit lines. In this way, banks are 
able to save on the cost of holding the liquid asset buffer in a way that 
finance companies, which make loans but do not take deposits, can-
not. Banks pass on the lower cost to their depositors and borrowers 
(Kashyap and others).
Deposit inflows during financial crises. As just discussed, banks 
will have an advantage in providing liquidity if deposit withdrawals 
and commitment draw-downs are not correlated. In fact, studies have 
shown that during past episodes of market stress, they were negatively 
related (Saidenberg and Strahan; Gatev and Strahan; Gatev, Schuer-
mann, and Strahan). For example, when the commercial paper market 
encountered stress, the funds that investors pulled out of this market 
flowed primarily into the banking system. As a result, deposits flowed 
into banks just as borrowers resorted to banks to draw down their credit 
lines. Thus, during past times of market stress, banks were flush with 
the funds needed to finance new commitments to borrowers. In this 
way, banks were better able to renew expiring credit lines and originate 
new loans during crises.
Most analysts agree that funds flow into bank deposits in times of 
stress because banks are viewed as safe havens due to government guar-
antees on deposits. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
insures deposits up to a limit set by Congress, and even deposits above 
this limit are viewed as having a degree of implicit government support. 
The  view that government guarantees are responsible for the deposit 
inflows during crises is supported by evidence that such deposit inflows 
did not occur prior to the FDIC’s inception in 1934 (Pennacchi). Dur-
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in bank deposits were observed. Depositors typically converted bank 
deposits into currency and gold. Moreover, depositors appear to have 
differentiated among banks, as deposit withdrawals in the 1920s and 
1930s related to a bank’s risk of default (Calomiris and Wilson). Con-
sistent with the view that banks had no advantage in providing liquidity 
during this period, liquidity shocks were accompanied by declines in 
bank loans and investments. To the extent that banks honored their 
loan commitments, they were forced to cut back on new lending, which 
translated to an observed overall decline in bank loans and investments. 
Why banks may have difficulty providing liquidity in a bank-centered crisis
Banks may not be able to provide liquidity in a bank-centered crisis. 
A main reason for this is that a bank-centered crisis may lead investors 
to question the safety of bank deposits, even with deposit insurance. 
This perception may prevent banks from receiving deposit inflows as 
part of a flight to safety, making it harder for them to meet the increased 
liquidity demands of borrowers. 
Bank deposits may be viewed as risky during a bank-centered crisis, 
despite deposit insurance, for several reasons. First, not all deposits are 
under the deposit insurance limit, and deposits over the limit are not 
explicitly guaranteed in the event of a bank failure. This lack of guar-
antee can become especially important in a bank-centered crisis, when 
uncertainty about the condition of an individual bank may prompt 
depositors to run from the bank even if it is actually healthy. Second, 
even for deposits under the insurance limit, there are fixed costs (in-
cluding time) to extracting deposits from banks that fail. Finally, in a 
bank-centered crisis, depositors may worry that the government will 
not provide enough resources to make them whole in the event of a 
bank failure. For example, some small depositors may worry that the 
deposit insurance fund will not be large enough for the FDIC to pay 
off all the insured deposits of failed banks, even though the FDIC has a 
line of credit from the Treasury.11 
   Banks may also face difficulty in providing liquidity during a 
bank-centered crisis if wholesale funds become more difficult to raise, 
especially from the private sector.12 Wholesale funds can be thought 
of as all nondeposit liabilities. These liabilities are uninsured borrow-
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banks, private nonbank investors, government-sponsored entities, and 
the Federal Reserve. Examples of wholesale funds are promissory notes, 
subordinated debt, and repurchase (repo) agreements (short-term loans 
secured by financial securities). 
Banks may find it harder to raise wholesale funds when bank fail-
ures become more likely. Such funds are the least likely to be protected 
in a bank failure, as they are subordinated to the claims of depositors. 
Even repos that are secured loans may become difficult to arrange be-
cause counterparties may not accept the collateral, knowing that they 
would have to sell it in an uncertain market if the borrowing bank 
failed. The difficulty of raising wholesale funds in a bank-centered crisis 
has become more relevant over time because they have become a greater 
source of funds for the banking system (increasing from roughly 8 per-
cent of assets in the early 1990s to 18 percent in 2007).13  
III.  NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE 2007-09 FINANCIAL 
CRISIS
The previous section showed that banks often have an advantage 
in providing liquidity to borrowers during times of financial stress–but 
not necessarily during a bank-centered crisis. Were banks still a source 
of liquidity during the 2007-09 crisis, or did the concentration of risks 
in the banking sector prevent them from fulfilling their traditional role? 
This section first examines aggregate bank loans and bank deposits to 
see if banks were as able to provide liquidity in this crisis as in previ-
ous ones. The section then uses individual bank data to see what bank 
characteristics, if any, made it more difficult for them to attract deposits 
to provide liquidity. The section ends with a discussion of the policy 
implications of these results.   
Aggregate deposit and loan growth of commercial banks
A useful first step in assessing the ability of banks to provide liquid-
ity is to compare deposit and loan growth during the crisis with that 
during the 1998 LTCM crisis. In making this comparison, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between three phases of the recent crisis, because 
deposits and loans behaved differently in the three phases. 
The first phase ran from the first week of July 2007 to the week of 
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ABCP run in the third quarter of 2007. This run followed losses in the 
subprime mortgage market and the suspension of redemptions in July 
2007 at several Bear Stearns hedge funds that had invested in subprime 
mortgages. The first phase ended just before the Lehman failure on 
September 15, 2008.
The second phase directly followed the Lehman bankruptcy and 
lasted until the end of September 2008. The Lehman bankruptcy led 
to major turmoil in financial markets, with dramatic effects on both 
deposit and loan growth. 
The third phase began in October 2008 and stretched into mid-
2009.14  It coincided with the passage of the Emergency Economic Sta-
bilization Act in Congress and other measures of official support of the 
financial system by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC. 
Deposits behaved much differently in the first phase of the finan-
cial crisis of 2007-09 than in the LTCM crisis. In particular, deposit 
growth rose sharply in the LTCM crisis but declined somewhat in the 
recent crisis. For example, deposit growth rose to a weekly growth rate 
of 0.19 percent in the fall of 1998, compared with a 0.06 percent aver-
age rise during the five years preceding that crisis (Table 1). 15 In con-
trast, average weekly deposit growth over the period from July 4, 2007, 
to September 10, 2008, while positive, actually fell relative to the pre-
ceding five years (0.07 percent compared with 0.10 percent). 
The difference in deposit growth between the LTCM crisis and the 
first phase of the recent crisis was not limited to total deposits. Differ-
ent growth rates also characterized core deposits, which exclude large 
time deposits. The fact that core deposit growth also declined in the 
first phase of the 2007-09 crisis is of interest because the fraction of 
core deposits that are insured is much greater than the fraction of total 
deposits. The contrasting behavior of core deposit growth in the two 
crises is even more striking, given the substantial easing of monetary 
policy in the 2007-09 crisis. From September 2007 to April 2008, the 
federal funds target was reduced by 3.25 percentage points, and the 
three-month Treasury bill rate fell nearly three points.16 Such a reduc-
tion in market interest rates usually leads to faster growth in core de-
posits. Banks are typically slow to adjust core deposit rates to a decline 
in market rates, and in the case of the most liquid deposits, the interest 
rate is typically close to, if not equal to, zero. As a result, core deposit 
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provide an alternative investment to deposits. Thus, holding deposit 
balances should not be as costly, which should contribute to a shift in 
household assets into deposits.17        
That deposit growth fell during the first phase of the 2007-09 cri-
sis instead of increasing, as in past crises, supports the view that banks 
are less able to provide liquidity in a bank-centered crisis.18 Because 
banking performance declined much more in 2007-09 than in past 
crises, depositors had more reason to be concerned about the safety of 
their funds. The concern about safety was exemplified by a depositor 
run at the failed IndyMac Bank in July 2008. This reaction may have 
been rational for many depositors because more than $500 million in 
deposits at IndyMac were not insured.19 Further, evaluating the condi-
tion of individual banks in the 2007-09 crisis was far from straightfor-
ward. Evaluating a bank’s exposure to mortgage-related products was 
difficult, and the interconnections in the system were complex. Finally, 
uncertainty over the safety of insured deposits may have increased as 
the FDIC’s reserves started to dip. By the end of 2008, the FDIC’s ratio 
of reserves to total insured deposits had fallen to 0.4 percent, and the 
Treasury did not increase its backup line of credit to the FDIC until 
March 2009.      
At first glance, the behavior of deposits in the next phase of the 
crisis appears inconsistent with the view that banks are unable to attract 
deposits in a bank-centered crisis. Deposits surged immediately fol-
lowing the Lehman failure, growing at a weekly rate of 0.95 percent in 
the last two weeks of September 2008 (Table 1). This surge, however, 
Table 1
AVERAGE WEEKLY DEPOSIT AND LOAN GROWTH
(ALL DOMESTICALLY CHARTERED BANKS, PERCENT)
1998 LTCM Crisis 2007-2009 Financial Crisis
Previous 
5 years to 
crisis
Fall 1998 Previous 
5 years to 
crisis
July 4, 2007 - 









2008 -            
July 1, 
2009




0.042 0.173 0.077 0.051 0.564 0.115
Loans 0.095 0.181 0.112 0.103 0.564 -0.049
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reflected the acute flight to safety out of money market funds immedi-
ately after the Lehman failure. While banks remained heavily exposed 
to losses on real estate loans and mortgage-related securities, other in-
stitutions and markets were suddenly perceived as even riskier. For ex-
ample, the Reserve Primary Fund, a prime money market mutual fund 
with close to $800 million of exposure to Lehman commercial paper, 
managed to “break the buck” on September 16, 2008. In other words, 
its net asset value fell below $1, exposing investors to losses. This event 
led to redemption demands across the money market mutual fund in-
dustry–in an amount close to $200 billion—as well as to a reallocation 
of funds to safer Treasury-only funds (Adrian and others; Kacperczyck 
and Schnabl; Federal Reserve). At the same time, households withdrew 
their assets from the stock market, which also took a hit around the 
same time (Chart 4). As a result, deposits poured into banks.     
Deposit growth subsided but remained solid in the third phase of 
the crisis, but this growth was supported by the adoption of emergency 
measures by the government. This phase began in early October 2008 
with the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. The Act 
provided greater explicit government support of the financial system, 
including an increase in the deposit insurance limit from $100,000 to 
$250,000 per depositor. This change was followed on October 14 with 
the FDIC’s announcement of its new temporary liquidity guarantee 
program. The FDIC stood willing to guarantee newly issued senior un-
secured debt of banks and thrifts and to fully cover noninterest—bear-
ing deposit transaction accounts, largely held by businesses. Together 
with other implicit guarantees of the financial system, these measures 
assured depositors that the banking system would hold up. As shown in 
Table 1, this helped support an average rate of weekly deposit growth of 
0.09 percent from October 2008 to mid-2009, above the subdued rate 
in the first phase of the crisis. 
In summary, the evidence on deposit growth provides some sup-
port for the view that banks are less able to provide liquidity in a bank-
centered crisis. Deposit growth slowed sharply in the first phase of the 
recent crisis, consistent with the view that depositors became concerned 
about the safety of their funds. Deposit growth later rebounded, but 
this rebound can be explained by the flight to safety out of money mar-
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Loans. Like deposit growth, loan growth surged in the LTCM cri-
sis but declined somewhat in the first phase of the 2007-09 crisis. From 
July 2007 to the Lehman failure in early September 2008, banks pro-
vided far less liquidity than in the LTCM crisis. Loan growth increased 
sharply in the LTCM crisis to a weekly growth rate of 0.18 percent in 
the fall of 1998, compared with 0.10 percent over the preceding five 
years (Table 1). In contrast, average weekly loan growth over the period 
from July 4, 2007, to September 10, 2008, edged down relative to the 
preceding five years (0.10 percent compared with 0.11 percent). 
This slowdown was consistent with the view that banks were less 
able to provide liquidity because they found it harder to attract depos-
its. Banks drew down liquid asset buffers to support lending and the 
buildup of assets that could not be sold in the market, as explained in 
Section II. Loan growth would have had to slow even more if banks had 
not also turned to other sources of funds to make up for the shortfall 
in deposit growth. 
These alternative sources of funds included borrowing from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System and the Federal Reserve 
System. Federal Home Loan Banks are government-sponsored entities 
able to issue debt at cheaper rates than banks (at least in the first year 
of the crisis) and re-intermediate these funds by lending them to com-
mercial banks and thrifts (Ashcraft and others). Indicative of the extent 
to which the U.S.-chartered commercial banking system was reliant 
on federal sources of funds, Federal Reserve loans rose $448 billion 
from 2007:Q4 to 2008:Q4, compared with a total net increase in bank 
liabilities of $1,136 billion. The FHLB stepped in earlier, with their 
loans increasing $208 billion from 2007:Q3 to 2008:Q3.20      
Bank lending shot up in the second phase of the crisis, reaching a 
weekly growth rate of 0.56 percent in the last two weeks of September 
2008 (Table 1). This rise coincided with an increased need for liquidity 
by firms as the volume of commercial paper plunged after the Lehman 
failure and commercial paper rates spiked (Chart 1). Finding them-
selves suddenly shut out of the commercial paper and other securities 
markets, borrowers drew down their credit lines, as suggested by the 
discussion of liquidity demand in financial crises in Section II (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein; Montoriol-Garriga and Sekeris; Gao and Yun). This 46  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
surge in bank lending was facilitated by the influx of deposits described 
earlier, as investors fled to safety. 
 In the third phase of the financial crisis, however, loan growth 
turned negative. Loans fell at an average weekly rate of 0.05 percent 
from October 8, 2008, to July 2009 (Table 1). That loans actually fell 
would seem to suggest that banks were not able to provide liquidity. 
However, it is unclear how much of this decline was due to lower loan 
supply resulting from weak deposit growth, and how much was due 
to lower demand for loans as the recession took hold of the economy. 
On the one hand, the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, a quarterly 
survey of bank lending standards conducted by the Federal Reserve, 
shows that lending standards began to tighten in the third quarter of 
2007 and only began to ease in 2010. This evidence suggests that loans 
declined because banks were less able or less willing to lend.21 But as the 
economy fell into a prolonged recession in the second year of the crisis, 
loan demand factors may have become more important, as businesses 
had less need for bank loans in the face of persistent weakness in sales 
and investment spending. 
Another reason demand for bank loans may have declined in this 
phase, besides the weak economy, was the success of programs initi-
ated by the Federal Reserve to support market-based financing. For 
example, the Federal Reserve announced the commercial paper Fund-
ing Facility (CPFF) on October 7, 2008, which became fully opera-
tional on October 27, 2008. It served as a lender of last resort for the 
commercial paper market, with the Federal Reserve directly financing 
purchases of commercial paper from eligible U.S. issuers. This program 
gave borrowers easier access to commercial paper funding, and they 
had less of a need to rely on credit lines from banks as a backstop.22 
As market conditions improved, corporate bond spreads also fell. The 
more attractive spreads allowed large corporations to turn to the bond 
market and repay bank loans (Federal Reserve). 
In summary, the evidence on loan growth also lends some support 
to the view that banks are less able to provide liquidity in a bank-cen-
tered crisis. In the first phase of the crisis, loan growth declined rather 
than increasing sharply as it did during the LTCM crisis. Like deposit 
growth, loan growth surged immediately following the Lehman bank-
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However, this surge was short-lived. Furthermore, loan growth turned 
negative in the third phase of the crisis, although this contraction was 
probably due more to weak loan demand than banks’ inability to pro-
vide liquidity.           
Bank-level evidence on the difference in liquidity provision
The comparison of liquidity provision in the 2007-09 crisis with 
that in past crises has so far relied on aggregate loan and deposit growth. 
Regression analysis at the individual bank level can provide more evi-
dence on whether banks were less able to provide liquidity in the recent 
crisis. Such analysis can also help determine whether the difference in 
liquidity provision in the recent crisis was due to the bank-centered 
nature of the crisis. 
An overview of the methodology. Two regressions are estimated 
using quarterly observations on individual banks from 1990 through 
2009—one for deposit growth and another for loan growth. The key 
explanatory variables in the regressions include a measure of financial 
stress, a measure of a bank’s exposure to liquidity demands, and mea-
sures of the safety of a bank’s deposits. As in previous studies, the mea-
sure of financial stress used is the commercial paper spread. Exposure to 
liquidity demand is measured by a bank’s unused commitments ratio, 
which is defined as the ratio of unused loan commitments to the sum 
of loans and unused commitments. Unused loan commitments are the 
parts of the credit lines that have not been drawn down. The rationale 
for measuring a bank’s liquidity demand exposure by the unused com-
mitment ratio is that the more commitments a bank has outstanding, 
the more exposed it will be to a drawdown of commitments when mar-
ket conditions tighten. 
The safety of a bank’s deposits is measured by its capital-asset ratio 
and a variable indicating whether the bank is big enough to be consid-
ered by investors as “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF). Well-capitalized banks 
are less likely to fail because capital serves as a buffer when unexpected 
losses occur. As a result, uninsured depositors at banks with high capi-
tal-asset ratios have less reason to worry about losing their deposits in a 
bank failure. Similarly, insured depositors at such banks have less reason 
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are considered safer because they are TBTF are captured in the regres-
sion by an indicator for the 25 largest banks as measured by asset size. 
The regressions allow bank liquidity provision to differ in the 
early and late stages of the recent crisis. The previous section noted 
that the aggregate behavior of deposits and loans differed significantly 
across three phases of the recent crisis—from July 2007 to the failure 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the two weeks following the 
Lehman Brothers failure, and from October 2008 to July 2009. The 
bank-level data is available only on a quarterly basis, however, making it 
impossible to distinguish the three phases of the crisis in the bank-level 
regressions. Instead, the crisis is divided into two phases—2007:Q3 to 
2008:Q2 and 2008:Q3 to 2009:Q2. (For further details on the regres-
sion equations and results, see the appendix.)   
Were banks less able to provide liquidity than in past crises? 
If banks have a natural advantage in providing liquidity in crises, the 
banks with the greatest exposure to liquidity demand could be expected 
to experience the highest growth in deposits and loans in a crisis. The 
regression results show that such a relationship existed in previous epi-
sodes of market stress but broke down in the 2007-09 financial crisis.
A convenient way to summarize the results is to use the regres-
sion coefficients to compute the impact of high financial stress on two 
hypothetical banks. The first bank is one with a “high” exposure to 
liquidity demand, as measured by the unused commitment ratio, while 
the second bank is one with a “low” exposure to liquidity demand in 
terms of the same measure. A high unused commitment ratio is defined 
as the 75th percentile among all observations in the sample. A bank in 
the 75th percentile would have an unused commitment ratio equal to 
0.17. A low unused commitment ratio is defined as the 25th percentile. 
A bank in the 25th percentile would have an unused commitment ratio 
equal to 0.07. 
The top panel of Table 2 reports the impact of a 100-basis point in-
crease in the commercial paper spread (the measure of market stress) on 
deposit and loan growth at the bank with the high unused commitment 
ratio relative to the bank with the low ratio.  For each estimate, the table 
also reports whether the regression coefficient on which the estimate is 
based is statistically significant, in the sense of being too different from 
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commercial paper spread raised deposit growth 0.22 percentage point 
more at a bank with a high unused commitment ratio than at a bank 
with a low unused commitment ratio (Table 2, top panel, column 1).23 
This effect is economically important when compared with an average 
deposit growth rate of 1.06 percent per quarter over the whole sample. 
The finding is in line with evidence from previous studies that looked 
at episodes of stress prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis (Gatev and 
Strahan; Gatev, Schuermann, and Strahan).
The data on aggregate deposit growth in the previous section sug-
gested that the banking system as a whole was less able to attract de-
posits in the recent crisis than in the LTCM crisis. Such a shortfall in 
overall deposit inflows would be of special concern if deposit inflows at 
banks with high exposure to liquidity demand did not increase as much 
relative to other banks as in past crises. The regression results confirm 
that such a shift in relative deposit growth occurred in the first phase 
of the recent crisis. Indeed, when market liquidity was tight during this 
period, the ability of banks with high exposure to liquidity demand to 
attract deposits appears to have actually decreased relative to banks with 
low exposure to liquidity demand. A 100-basis point increase in the 
commercial paper spread contracted deposit growth 0.11 percentage 
point more at a bank with a high unused commitment ratio than at a 
bank with a low ratio. This amounted to a decrease of 0.33 percentage 
point in the differential impact of high financial stress from the pre-
crisis period (Table 2, top panel, column 1). 
Only in the second phase of the crisis did the deposit inflow rela-
tionship return to its pre-crisis one, consistent with the aggregate evi-
dence discussed in the previous section. During this period, a 100-ba-
sis-point increase in the commercial paper spread raised deposit growth 
0.27 percentage point more at a bank with a high unused commitment 
ratio than at a bank with a low ratio, a (statistically insignificant) differ-
ence of only 0.05 from the pre-2007 effect.
In the first phase of the crisis, the counterpart of the weaker deposit 
inflows at banks with high exposure to liquidity demand was more ane-
mic lending growth at the same banks (Table 2, top panel, column 2). 
Before the crisis and in line with previous studies, a 100-basis-point 
widening of the commercial paper spread increased loan growth 0.34 
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Table 2
ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF MARKET STRESS ON DEPOSIT 
AND LOAN GROWTH ACROSS BANKS: WAS IT DIFFER-
ENT IN THE 2007-2009 CRISIS?
Dependent variable (percentage points):
(1) (2)
Δ Deposits/ Assetst-1 Δ Loans/ Assetst-1
The differential  impact of a 100 basis point increase 
in the CP spread (stress) on a bank with a high share of 
commitments relative to a bank with a low share:
Before 2007-09 Crisis 0.22*** 0.34***
2007Q3-2008Q2 -0.11*** 0.09***
Change from before crisis -0.33*** -0.25**
2008Q3-2009Q2 0.27*** -0.14***
Change from before crisis 0.05 -0.48***
The differential  impact of a 100-basis-point increase 
in the CP spread (stress) on a bank with a high capital 
ratio relative to a bank with a low capital ratio:
Before 2007-09 Crisis -0.03 -0.16***
2007Q3-2008Q2 0.08* -0.08***
Change from before crisis 0.11** 0.08
2008Q3-2009Q2 0.16*** 0.03***
Change from before crisis 0.19*** 0.19***
The differential  impact of a 100-basis-point increase 
in the CP spread (stress) on a large bank relative to a 
small bank:
Before 2007-09 Crisis -0.03 0.30
2007Q3-2008Q2 1.47*** 0.60
Change from before crisis 1.50*** 0.30
2008Q3-2009Q2 -0.23 0.60
Change from before crisis -0.20 0.30
Memorandum:
Average quarterly growth in dependent variable 1.06 1.04
Notes: The ***, **, and * denote the relevant coefficient estimates from the corresponding regression 
in Table A.1 are statistically significantly different from zero at the one percent, five percent, and ten 
percent  levels,  respectively.         
A bank with a “high” share of commitments (or capital) is taken to be at the 75th percentile, while a 
bank with a ‘low’ share of commitments (or capital) is taken to be at the 25th percentile. 
The 75th percentile commitment ratio is equal to 0.17 and the 25th is equal to 0.07, implying a differ-
ence of 0.1. The 75th percentile capital ratio is equal to 0.106 and the 25th percentile is equal to 0.076, 
implying a difference of 0.03. A large bank is one in the top 25, while a small bank is one not in the 
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than at a bank with low exposure. In contrast, in the first year of the cri-
sis, the same increase in the commercial paper spread raised loan growth 
only 0.09 percentage point more at a bank with high exposure to com-
mitments than at a bank with low exposure, a decline of 0.25 percentage 
point from the pre-crisis period. Banks with high unused commitments 
may have been able to honor pre-existing loan commitments as their 
customers drew them down. However, to the extent such drawdowns 
occurred, they presumably came at the expense of new loan originations, 
given the relative weakness in the banks’ overall loan growth. 
In the second year of the crisis, rather than regaining their usual 
lending advantage in times of financial stress, banks with high expo-
sure to liquidity demand suffered a further erosion in that advantage. 
During this period, a 100-basis-point increase in the commercial paper 
spread lowered loan growth 0.14 percentage point more at a bank with 
a high unused commitment ratio than at a bank with a low ratio, a 
difference of 0.48 percentage point from the pre-crisis period. Thus, 
during this phase of the crisis, the rebound in relative deposit growth 
at banks with high unused commitments did not translate into higher 
relative loan growth at the same banks. This result is consistent with 
these banks cutting back on lending to businesses as soon as they were 
able to do so. For example, they may have stopped renewing credit 
lines, decreased the backup funds, and originated fewer new loans.24 
Together, the deposit and lending results suggest that the very banks 
that had offered insurance to businesses and households before the crisis 
in the form of commitments were not as well positioned to deliver the 
promised liquidity.
Which banks suffered the biggest decline in ability to provide 
liquidity? Was it the bank-centered nature of the crisis that compro-
mised the ability of banks to provide liquidity? If so, banks perceived 
as risky should have had more difficulty attracting deposits and making 
loans than banks perceived as safe. The regression results provide some 
support for such a relationship, especially on the deposit side.
As before, a convenient way to summarize these results is to use the 
regression coefficients to compute the impact of high financial stress 
on two hypothetical banks. When safety of deposits is measured by the 
capital-asset ratio, the safe bank is considered to be one with a capital-
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bank is one with a capital-asset ratio in the 25th percentile (0.076). 
When safety of deposits is measured by the size of the bank, the safe 
bank is one in the top 25 and the risky bank is one outside the top 25. 
The middle panel of Table 2 shows the differential impact of a 100-ba-
sis point increase in the commercial paper spread on the first pair of 
banks, while the bottom panel shows the differential impact on the 
second pair.
Before the recent crisis, increases in financial stress had about the 
same effect on banks likely to be perceived as safe as at banks likely to be 
perceived as risky.  The effect of a 100-basis-point increase in the com-
mercial paper spread on deposit growth at a bank with a high capital-as-
set ratio differed by only 0.03 percentage point from the effect on deposit 
growth at a bank with a low-capital asset ratio (Table 2, middle panel, 
column 1).  Moreover, it is not possible to statistically distinguish this ef-
fect from zero. The impact of financial stress on deposit growth was also 
roughly the same at a bank in the top 25 as at a bank outside the top 25. 
This is in accord with previous studies of the modern U.S. era that found 
that bank riskiness and size were not particularly associated with deposit 
inflows during times of market stress (Gatev and Strahan). In previous 
crises, depositors did not seem to distinguish between banks according to 
the perceived risk of their deposits.     
In contrast, the regression results indicate that the safety of deposits 
was an important factor affecting relative deposit inflows in the 2007-
09 financial crisis. As market conditions became strained, the ability of 
better capitalized banks to draw in deposits improved relative to that of 
less capitalized banks. In the first phase of the crisis, a 100-basis point 
increase in the commercial paper spread raised deposit growth 0.08 
percentage point more at a bank with a high capital-asset ratio than at a 
bank with a low capital-asset ratio—a change of 0.11 percentage point 
from before the crisis (Table 2, middle panel, column 1). In the second 
phase of the crisis, the differential impact of financial stress on banks 
with high and low capital-asset ratios was even greater—0.16 percent-
age point, representing an increase of 0.19 percentage point from the 
pre-crisis period.     
The largest 25 banks were also more successful than smaller banks 
in attracting deposits but, in this case, only in the first phase of the 
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paper spread was associated with deposit growth 1.47 percentage points 
higher at a bank in the top 25 than at a bank not in the top 25. This 
differential effect is considerable, considering average quarterly deposit 
growth of 1.06 percent. The apparent preference of depositors for the 
largest banks did not carry through to the second phase of the crisis. 
During this phase, the effect of financial stress on deposit growth at 
banks in the top 25 was not statistically significantly different from the 
effect on deposit growth at banks outside the top 25. Reduced uncer-
tainty about the quality of bank assets and greater insurance coverage 
limits might explain why the TBTF banks lost their advantage in at-
tracting deposits during this stage of the crisis. In principle, though, a 
decrease in uncertainty should also have reduced the impact of the cap-
ital-asset ratio on deposit flows, which as noted above, did not occur.   
The regression results also suggest that well-capitalized banks did 
a better job than TBTF banks at channeling their deposit inflows to 
loans. The greater deposit funding inflows experienced by the well-cap-
italized banks did not at first translate into appreciably higher lending. 
Before the crisis, a 100-basis-point increase in the commercial paper 
spread actually decreased loan growth 0.16 percentage point more at a 
bank with a high capital ratio than at a bank with a low capital ratio. 
This negative impact of financial stress on the relative loan growth of 
highly capitalized banks diminished in the first phase of the recent crisis 
to 0.08 percentage point. However, the difference from the pre-crisis 
period was not statistically significant, so the greater ability of highly 
capitalized banks to attract deposits in the first phase of the crisis does 
not imply increased lending. In the second phase of the crisis, the same 
increase in the commercial paper spread raised loan growth 0.03 per-
centage point more at the bank with the high capital-asset ratio than at 
the bank with the low capital-asset ratio. This difference in loan growth 
was small. Compared with the pre-2007 era, however, it represented 
a statistically significant improvement in the relative ability of highly 
capitalized banks to extend loans in times of high financial stress.25
The TBTF banks showed no such increase in relative loan growth 
during the recent financial crisis, despite being awash with deposit in-
flows. In both phases of the  crisis, a 100-basis-point increase in the 
commercial paper spread is estimated to have raised loan growth 0.60 
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the top 25 (Table 2, bottom panel, column 2).  These estimated differ-
ences appear large relative to the average loan growth of 1.04 percent in 
the sample. However, the estimates are not statistically significant.  As 
a result, they do not imply that financial stress increased loan growth 
more at TBTF banks than other banks in the recent crisis.    
Policy implications
The results of this section have shown that deposits and loans rose 
less in the 2007-09 crisis than in recent past crises. The behavior of 
deposits and loans also differed across banks. Banks most vulnerable 
to liquidity drawdowns did not have bigger deposit inflows and had to 
rely more on other sources of borrowing and liquid assets to fund used 
commitments. Also, riskier banks and non-TBTF banks experienced 
the smallest inflows of deposits. This evidence supports the view that 
total deposit inflows were lower because of the bank-centered nature of 
the crisis.   
Several implications follow from these results. First, banks are not 
necessarily able to adequately fulfill their role as a backstop of liquid-
ity. This finding may imply that policymakers need to design other 
mechanisms to ensure an uninterrupted supply of credit to creditwor-
thy borrowers. Such mechanisms could include direct interventions in 
markets, such as the Federal Reserve’s commercial paper Funding Facil-
ity that helped to support issuance of short-term paper by businesses. 
Moreover, federal funding of temporary programs to avoid critical dis-
ruptions in credit and liquidity may be justified.
Second, while it may be desirable for banks to receive inflows of 
deposits in financial crises so that they can meet the extra demand for 
liquidity, it is nonetheless important from a public policy view to un-
derstand what is driving these inflows. If certain banks are seen as a safe 
haven, not because they are necessarily financially sound, but because 
they are perceived as TBTF, their risk-taking incentives will be distorted 
(Hoenig). Thus, if policymakers want to put an end to TBTF and also 
want large banks to continue to serve as a source of liquidity during 
crises, they should take steps to improve the supervision and regulation 
of these institutions. 
The two implications above assume no fundamental change in 
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implication of the empirical results. This implication concerns what ac-
tivities banks should be engaged in, in the first place. An explicit separa-
tion between regulated banks that are meant to intermediate liquidity 
and the rest of the financial system could arguably be justified. Under 
this approach, regulated banks would be allowed to accept deposits and 
provide backstop liquidity to firms and households but would be lim-
ited in the amount of risk that they could take through their other loans 
and investments. Such an approach would help to keep banks as safe 
institutions able to provide liquidity in times of market stress, which is 
an important function they perform.26
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The motivating question of this article was whether banks can 
maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when they are at the 
center of a financial crisis. Some observers have conjectured that deposit 
inflows should have been an assured, stable source of funding even dur-
ing the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
This article examined whether this conjecture was valid. The main 
message is that bank deposit funds cannot be assumed to be robust to 
any type of market liquidity stress. In the last crisis, depositors shunned 
banks generally when there was greater uncertainty about the health 
of banks and uncertainty over whether the government would support 
the financial system. Only in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy, 
increased distress in other asset markets, and ensuing official liquid-
ity interventions, did deposit inflows become vigorous. Too-big-to-fail 
considerations also influenced deposits, with inflows going to the larg-
est 25 banks, especially during the first year of the crisis. 
These findings—together with results showing that lending growth 
was weak overall, especially at banks most exposed to liquidity de-
mand—suggest that banks were not as able to provide liquidity as would 
be implied by theory and evidence from other crises. Thus, policymak-
ers may want to evaluate the tradeoffs associated with two alternative 
policy paths. In the first, banks may be subject to periodic panics when-
ever they are perceived to be exposed to a financial crisis. In this case, 
policymakers offer official support to the financial system, businesses, 
and households as they did in the recent financial crisis. Coupled with 
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to ensure that banks’ risk-taking incentives are not distorted as a result 
of this official support. In the alternative and more fundamental path, 
an explicit separation would be drawn between regulated banks and 
the rest of the financial system. Stricter limits would be placed on the 
activities that banks can engage in so as to ensure that they can serve as 
liquidity providers without official intervention in times of crisis.      ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  57
APPENDIX
This appendix provides further detail on the data, methodology, 
and results for the bank-level regressions of Section III. The data for 
the regressions are made up of quarterly observations on commercial 
banks in existence from 1990 through 2009. Following previous stud-
ies, the sample excludes the smallest banks with assets of less than $100 
million. All bank-level variables are from the quarterly Reports of Con-
dition and Income that banks file with regulators (Call Reports). The 
sample is not fixed but changes from quarter to quarter, as some banks 
enter the sample (for example, through new charters) and other banks 
exit (for example, through mergers). Banks belonging to a common 
holding company are aggregated and treated as a single banking orga-
nization. Therefore, any reference to a “bank” in the remainder of this 
discussion should be taken to mean a banking organization.     
The dependent variable in the regressions is either quarterly loan 
growth or quarterly deposit growth. Deposit growth is defined as the 
change in deposits from the previous quarter divided by assets in the 
previous quarter. Loan growth is defined similarly. The growth rates 
are not adjusted for the artificial increase in growth that can occur as a 
result of one bank acquiring another in a merger. Instead, the merger 
effect is controlled for through the common practice of dropping an 
observation when the quarterly growth rate of a bank’s total assets ex-
ceeds a certain threshold—in this case, 10 percent (Gatev and Strahan).
The regressions include fixed effects (dummy variables) for both 
banks and quarters. Including bank fixed effects controls for the many 
factors that could cause a particular bank to have higher deposit growth 
in all periods (for example, location in a fast-growing market or good 
management). Similarly, including dummy variables for quarters con-
trols for factors that could cause all banks to have higher deposit growth 
in a particular quarter (for example, easy monetary policy or rapid eco-
nomic growth in the nation as a whole).
The explanatory variables are the same for the loan growth and 
deposit growth regressions. The regression is similar to the model speci-
fied in a previous study by Gatev and Strahan.27 The deposit growth 
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As explained in Section III, unused commitments is the ratio of un-
used commitments to the sum of loans and unused commitments at 
the end of the quarter. Stress is the average daily three-month commer-
cial paper spread for high–grade nonfinancial borrowers for the quarter. 
Safety is represented by the ratio of the book value of equity to assets 
at the end of the quarter and by a dummy variable indicating whether 
the bank was one of the 25 largest banks at the end of the quarter. A 
one-quarter lag is used for unused commitments and the two safety mea-
sures to ensure that these variables are predetermined with respect to a 
bank’s deposit growth. Finally, crisis is represented by two dummy vari-
ables, crisis1 and crisis2. Crisis1 refers to the period from 2007:Q3 to 
2008:Q2, while crisis2 refers to the period from 2008:Q3 to 2009:Q2.             
The influence of financial stress on banks’ ability to provide liquidity 
is captured by the interactive variable unused commitments x stress. A find-
ing that b2 is positive would support the view that banks more exposed to 
liquidity demand typically have an advantage over other banks in attract-
ing deposits when financial stress rises. Likewise, in the case of the loan 
growth regression, a finding that b2 is positive would support the view 
that banks more exposed to liquidity demand have an advantage over 
other banks in making loans when financial markets become strained. 
The change in the influence of financial stress on banks’ ability to 
provide liquidity in the recent crisis is captured by the interactive vari-
able unused commitments x stress x crisis. A finding that b3 is negative 
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had a smaller advantage over other banks in attracting deposits in the 
recent crisis than in past crises. Indeed, a finding that b2 +  b3 is nega-
tive would imply that in the recent crisis the ability of banks with high 
exposure to liquidity demand to attract deposits fell relative to that of 
other banks as financial stress rose. Both types of banks would experi-
ence a fall in deposit growth in the face of an increase in spreads, but 
a bank with a higher unused commitment ratio would have a greater 
contraction than a bank with a low ratio. 
The influence of a bank’s perceived safety on its ability to provide 
liquidity in a crisis is captured by the interactive variable safety x stress. 
A finding that γ2 is positive would mean that before the recent crisis, 
banks viewed as safe had an advantage over other banks in attracting 
deposits when financial stress was high. To assess whether the relation-
ship changed in the recent crisis, the variable of interest is safety x stress 
x crisis. If the coefficient γ3 on this variable is estimated to be positive, 
that would support the view that banks seen as safe had a bigger advan-
tage over other banks in attracting deposits as spreads widened in the 
recent crisis than in past crises.  
Table A.1 reports estimates of the coefficients on the explanatory 
variables for the deposit growth equation in column (1), and for the 
loan growth equation in column (2). The coefficients on unused com-
mitments x stress are positive and statistically significant in both the de-
posit growth and loan growth equations. These results confirm that 
before the recent crisis, banks most at risk of liquidity demand real-
izations experienced the greatest increase in deposit growth and loan 
growth when financial markets became stressed.  Furthermore, the co-
efficients on unused commitments x stress x crisis are negative and sta-
tistically significant in three out of the four cases, the exception being 
the coefficient for crisis2 in the deposit growth equation. These results 
generally support the view that banks with high exposure to liquidity 
demand had less advantage (a disadvantage in some cases) over other 
banks in attracting deposits and making loans in the recent crisis than 
in past crises.   
The coefficients on the safety variables provide some evidence in 
support of the bank-centered nature of the 2007-09 crisis. For both the 
capital-asset ratio and the large bank indicator, the coefficients on safety 
x stress are either negative or statistically insignificant. These results in-60  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Dependent variable:
(1) (2)
Δ Deposits/Assetst-1 Δ Loans/Assetst-1
Unused commitment ratiot-1 0.024*** 0.111***
Unused commitment ratiot-1  ×  Stress                       0.022*** 0.034***
Unused commitment ratiot-1    ×    Stress    ×    Crisis1                          -0.033*** -0.025***
Unused commitment ratiot-1    ×    Stress    ×    Crisis2                          0.005 -0.048***
Capital ratiot-1 0.125*** 0.065***
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress                                                                -0.009 -0.053***
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis1                                      0.034** 0.026
Capital ratiot-1  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis2                                                      0.061*** 0.064***
Large Bank Indicator (Top 25 by asset size) -0.0005 0.003
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress                                          -0.0003 0.003
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis1                                                                        0.015*** 0.003
Large Bank Indicator  ×  Stress  ×  Crisis2                                                                       -0.002 0.003
Observations 252526 252526
R2 0.04 0.08
 *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: All specifications are panel regressions with fixed effects for banks and quarters. The reported 
R2 is the within R2. 
The interaction of the three-month Treasury bill rate with unused commitment ratio is also controlled 
for. The sample period is 1990Q1 to 2009Q4. Crisis1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2007Q3 to 
2008Q2, and Crisis2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2.
Bank panel data are from the Reports of Condition and Income, and are aggregated to top holder level. 
Bank organizations with assets of less than $100 million are excluded. 
As a merger control, all banks with asset growth greater than 10% during a quarter are excluded during 
that quarter. The growth rates are also winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect 
of outliers. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are clustered at the bank level.
Table A.1. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET STRESS AND 
GROWTH IN DEPOSITS AND LOANS: WAS IT DIFFER-
ENT IN THE 2007-2009 CRISIS?
(ALLOWING FOR TWO PHASES OF THE CRISIS: 2007
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dicate that before the recent crisis, banks perceived as safe did not ex-
perience a greater increase in deposit or loan growth than other banks 
as financial stress rose. In the case of the capital-asset ratio, three of the 
four coefficients on safety x stress x crisis are positive and statistically 
significant, the exception being the coefficient for crisis1 in the loan 
growth equation that is statistically insignificant. These results generally 
support the view that highly capitalized banks had a bigger advantage 
over other banks in attracting deposits and making loans in the recent 
crisis than in past crises.     
The results for large banks are more mixed. The coefficient on safety 
x stress x crisis in the deposit growth regression is positive and statisti-
cally significant for crisis1, indicating that TBTF banks had a greater 
advantage over other banks in raising deposits when market liquidity 
was tight in the first phase of the 2007-09 crisis than in previous crises. 
However, the other three coefficients on safety x stress x crisis are statisti-
cally insignificant. Thus, the favorable impact of financial stress on the 
relative deposit growth of large banks did not persist beyond the first 
phase of the crisis and did not spill over into loan growth.
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ENDNOTES
1Commercial paper is short-term debt with a fixed maturity typically be-
tween one and 270 days, and on average 30 days. The commercial paper market 
is an important source of short-term unsecured funds for firms to cover major 
operating costs such as payroll and inventory. 
2There was also a brief increase in the commercial paper spread in April 2001, 
which has no obvious explanation. This may reflect expectations at the time that 
the U.S. federal government would be running surpluses and that there would be 
an accompanying fall in the supply of Treasuries. This would have helped to push 
down Treasury yields (and push up the spread).
3These figures are based on the author’s calculations from the Federal Re-
serve’s collected data on commercial paper outstanding. Outstanding ABCP ac-
counted for 55 percent of the total Commercial Paper market of $2.2 trillion in 
July 2007, up from only 20 percent of the market in 1997. 
4This crisis was not the first bank-centered crisis, nor did it only involve 
banks. First, the comparison is simply with recent crises, and not historical ones 
such as the Great Depression in which banks were central. Second, in this crisis, 
there were arguably even greater risks in the financial system outside commercial 
banking: in investment banks such as Lehman Brothers, in large insurance firms 
such as AIG, and in other nonbank entities such as the two Bear Stearns’ hedge 
funds that had invested in subprime mortgages and filed for bankruptcy on July 
31, 2007. The point is simply that significant risks were also found in the U.S. 
commercial banking system in this crisis. 
5Write-offs on delinquent mortgage loans, asset fire sales, market valuation 
losses on mortgage-related securities, and trading losses were all contributing fac-
tors to the drop in profitability. 
6Commercial banks’ total holdings of real-estate related loans and mortgage-
backed securities (available for sale and held to maturity) are estimated by the 
author at $4,894 billion at the end of 2007, based on the Call Reports filed by 
banks. This figure compares with total real-estate related debt securities outstand-
ing of $11,840 billion (Krishnamurthy). The bank exposure does not include the 
off-balance-sheet items that banks were ultimately responsible for, up to another 
$1,737 billion. These off-balance-sheet exposures came from the following: un-
used commitments in the form of revolving open-end lines secured by 1-4 family 
mortgage loans, unused commitments to fund commercial real estate loans, and 
maximum credit exposure from recourse and unused commitments to provide 
liquidity to asset securitizations, asset sales and conduit structures.  Explanations 
for why commercial banks ended up retaining so much exposure to the real estate 
market range from a breakdown of risk-management systems, to excessive opti-
mism, to regulatory arbitrage, to banks simply needing to hold these securities as 
collateral for repos. ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  63
7Financial commercial paper was a marginal source of funding for the U.S. 
commercial banking system in this crisis; its issuance rose from $21.7 billion in 
2006 to $37.9 billion in 2007, most of which was in the second half of 2007. 
These figures are based on the author’s calculations from the Federal Reserve’s 
Flow of Funds Table F.208. 
8Subprime mortgage securities totaled only about $1.5 trillion, a fraction of 
the roughly $30 trillion in total assets at all U.S. financial institutions and more 
than $10 trillion at commercial banks (Gorton; Krishnamurthy).
9In this article, the term liquidity refers to funding liquidity, which is the ease 
of borrowing funds. Another concept of liquidity is the ease with which an asset 
can be traded. The latter  concept is sometimes referred to as market liquidity to 
distinguish it from funding liquidity (Brunnermeier and Pedersen).
10Even ABCP conduits that suffered material credit deterioration were 
brought on sponsors’ balance sheets beginning in August 2007. (Banks such as 
Citibank are known as the “sponsors” of these vehicles.) In this crisis, the recourse 
and credit guarantees provided by sponsors ended up covering 97 percent of ma-
turing ABCP (Acharya and others). 
11For example, there is evidence of risk-pricing even for insured deposits dur-
ing the 1980s savings and loan crisis. Specifically, rates on FSLIC-insured depos-
its were sensitive to a bank’s riskiness in the period before the insolvency of the 
FSLIC. The FSLIC was the guarantor of the savings and loan institutions, and it 
was announced to be insolvent in February 1987. It was later abolished, and its 
duties were transferred to the FDIC (Cook and Spellman).
12Evidence of banks having difficulty getting wholesale funds from the private 
sector in the 2007-09 financial crisis is documented by Brunnermeier, Kacperczyk 
and Schnabl, and Adrian and others. The transmission of the recent crisis partly 
through a disruption in wholesale funding followed the script outlined earlier by 
Rajan for a crisis where banks are perceived as credit risks and there is uncertainty 
about where losses are to be found. Moreover, interbank lending, especially at 
maturities longer than overnight, can dry up in a bank-centered crisis. While the 
banking system does not depend on interbank loans as a source of wholesale funds 
due to netting out in aggregate, the interbank market is an important source of 
wholesale funds for banks with a liquidity shortage. Typically, it allows for an ef-
ficient transfer of funds from banks with a liquidity surplus to banks that are short 
of liquidity.   
13Wholesale funds are defined as the sum of subordinated debt and deben-
tures, gross federal funds purchased, repos, and other borrowed money, and are 
based on the author’s calculations from the Call Reports. If large time deposits 
and deposits in foreign offices are also included, the share goes from about 25 
percent in the early 1990s to over 40 percent before the 2007-09 financial crisis. 64  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
14The end of the financial crisis in mid-2009 reflects the positive signal pro-
vided by the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (bank stress tests) (Ber-
nanke). 
15This aggregated data comes from the Federal Reserve H8 release for balance 
sheet data for weekly commercial bank reporters. The data are for all domesti-
cally chartered banks (excluding the branches and agencies of foreign banks). The 
weekly growth rates reported in Table 1 are defined as the weekly change in the 
variable divided by total assets in the previous week. Also note that the third pe-
riod of the 2007-09 financial crisis shown in Table 1 omits the week of October 1, 
2008. This is because there was an artificial jump in the balance sheet of commer-
cial banks in that week because of their acquisition of non-banks. For example, 
JPMorgan Chase acquired a large thrift, Washington Mutual, on September 26, 
2008. This and other nonbank mergers around that time led to a considerable 
increase of $267 billion in assets for the week of October 1, 2008. However, 
neither JPMorgan Chase’s acquisition of Bear Stearns in March 2008 nor Bank 
of America’s later purchase of Merrill Lynch impacts the H8 data because these 
consolidations took place at the holding company level and did not affect the 
commercial bank aggregates reported. 
16The federal funds target rate was 5.25 percent in September 2007. It then 
fell to 2 percent by April 2008, and after several cuts beginning in October 2008, 
reached its current range of 0 to 0.25 percent in December 2008.
17 During this period, monetary policy was also engaged in substantial asset 
purchases and emergency liquidity provision to the financial system. Normally, 
one would expect such actions to lead to substantial increases in bank reserves, 
which would then translate into higher bank deposits through the standard text-
book money multiplier. However, this multiplier channel was not active in this 
period because the Federal Reserve began to pay interest on reserves in October 
2008. This removed commercial banks’ opportunity cost of holding excess re-
serves, and banks were happy to place reserves in balances at the Federal Reserve 
(Keister and McAndrews). As a result, excess bank reserves went from a mere $1.9 
billion in August 2008 to close to $60 billion in September 2008 and now stand 
at over $1 trillion (Federal Reserve H3 release). 
18Other factors besides concern over safety may have contributed to the 
weak deposit inflows. One such factor was that household wealth took a hit in 
this crisis, and households are typically the main source of deposit funds. U.S. 
households’ net worth fell from $64.4 trillion in 2006 to $51.3 trillion by 2008 
(from falling house values and stock market declines). These figures come from 
the Federal Reserve’s Z.1 Release, Table B.100.  Moreover, households faced with 
increased liquidity constraints may have been more likely to withdraw deposits to 
cover consumption needs. 
19See The Wall Street Journal, “Humble Start for FDIC Push,” June 24, 2010.ECONOMIC REVIEW • THIRD QUARTER 2010  65
20These figures are based on the author’s calculations from the Federal Re-
serve’s Flow of Funds Table F.110 for U.S. chartered commercial banks. The 
weekly H8 release does not provide a split of other borrowing into government 
and non-government sources.
21There is also evidence of these loan supply effects from a number of recent 
studies. For example, banks exposed to U.S. subprime mortgages rejected signifi-
cantly more loan applications than non-affected banks (Puri and others). Another 
study found that businesses holding sufficiently high buffers of cash were able to 
maintain their investment spending, but those with low cash buffers had to cut 
their investment spending because they were not able to access bank loans (Duch-
in and others). This effect disappeared in the second year of the crisis, suggesting 
that demand factors may have become more important over time as businesses 
had less of a need for bank loans.
22Another program that helped revive the commercial paper market was the 
ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). In this program, 
the Federal Reserve extended loans to U.S. depository institutions and bank hold-
ing companies to buy high-grade ABCP from money market mutual funds. The 
AMLF began operations on September 22, 2008, and reached peak use on Octo-
ber 8, before the CPFF was made operational (Adrian and others). 
23Specifically, the differential effect is calculated using the corresponding coef-
ficient in Table A.1, which is equal to 0.022. This coefficient is multiplied by the 
assumed increase in the Commercial Paper spread of 1 percentage point and by the 
difference in the unused commitment ratio between the 75th and 25th percentile 
(0.10). Therefore, the differential effect = 0.022*1*0.10 = 0.22 percentage point.
24For example, if instead of a regression of on-balance-sheet lending as shown, 
the regression is for total new bank credit originations (defined as the change in 
the sum of loans and commitments), there is an even more pronounced negative 
effect on credit. Banks with a high exposure to unused commitments cut their 
total new credit by more, even in the first year of the financial crisis.
25In related work, Cornett and others find that better capitalized banks in-
creased lending more than other banks during the financial crisis of 2007-09. 
26For example, Holmstrom draws a comparison with the LTCM and Tech 
bubble crises where, because risk was shared in equity markets, the crises did 
not damage the banking system. In a similar way, had the riskier tranches of the 
mortgage-related securities been held outside the banking system, vital liquidity 
disruptions would not have occurred. He concludes that “risk should be shared in 
equity markets and not in liquidity providing markets.” 
27Gatev and Strahan estimated a similar model for an earlier sample period 
(1991-2000). The main extension here is to allow market stress to have a different 
effect in the 2007-09 financial crisis than before. The author replicated their find-
ings over their sample with very similar results, which are available upon request. 66  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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